Month: February 2024

The MacSharry Reform thus had two main objectives. First, reformers needed to bring the budget under control in both the short and long term, with specific attention paid to the surplus problem. Second, a reform had to be adopted that would bring support for agriculture into compliance with liberalized GATT trade rules without prompting a rebellion among European farmers and their political allies. While the MacSharry Reform laid the groundwork for a GATT agreement, it failed to reduce CAP spending. Instead, CAP spending increased even further in the years following the MacSharry Reform and excess production continued, albeit at a lower level. Given the crisis conditions confronted, the MacSharry Reform should have been a prime opportunity for cuts to be imposed on agricultural spending, yet as my argument predicts, it proved impossible to cut spending on farmers. Farmers simply received that money from new sources. The final agreement of MacSharry Reform included four central components. The first was a series of price cuts for cereals, beef, and dairy. The second component paired these cuts with compensatory payments to offset losses incurred by farmers stemming from the newly lowered prices. These reforms marked what would be the beginning of the process of decoupling CAP payments from production. The third initiative was a set-aside program that required land to be removed from production, with farmers being compensated for this out-of-production land. Finally, the fourth reform was a package of three non-binding accompanying measures that affirmed the environmental role of farmers, offered subsidies for land afforestation ,equipment for vertical farming and set up an early retirement scheme for farmers.

The purpose of this chapter is to account for the content of the 1992 MacSharry Reform and to explain why, despite the fact that there was urgent need for major change, the reform failed to reduce spending. The confluence of two major crises, budgetary and trade-related, allowed Agricultural Commissioner Ray MacSharry to make bolder proposals than had ever before been seriously considered in a round of CAP reform. As my framework for CAP reform conditions predicts, a context of disruptive politics facilitated the proposal and consideration of more dynamic reforms than would have normally been possible. These extraordinary circumstances were not enough to hold back the influence of farmers and their representatives, however, or produce a reduction in CAP spending. The disparate needs and demands of the member states led to a watering down of the final version of the reform so that changes were more circumscribed than initially proposed or even entirely abandoned; there were also significant side-payments to farmers. Disruptive politics were therefore important in facilitating the serious discussion and consideration of fundamental changes but they were not enough to stop the farmers from significantly weakening the final agreement and extracting compensation. The composition of the final reform package is consistent with my claim that it is difficult if not impossible to cut agricultural spending. Decoupling support from production simply led to farmers being paid via a new program, and not to actual meaningful cuts in farmer supports. Finally, the CAP reform process shared many features with welfare state retrenchment. The most ambitious and far-reaching reforms, like price cuts, were significantly watered down, and some, like shifting compensation in favor of small farmers while limiting payments for large farmers, were defeated outright. The core reforms ended up following a “vice into virtue logic”: rather than eliminating programs, existing programs were adjusted to fix inefficiencies and problems with their operation.

The final package included a number of side-payments, concessions, and exemptions in order to facilitate the agreement and overall spending levels increased, rather than decreased. The timing, negotiations, and content of the MacSharry Reform were fundamentally shaped by two pressing issues: rapidly ballooning spending that was pushing the CAP budget to the brink of sustainability and GATT Uruguay Round negotiations that were being held up by agriculture. Both of these pressures threatened the CAP’s continued existence. Without a correction to spending related to high prices and out of control production, agricultural expenditures would grow beyond the point of sustainability. A failed GATT Uruguay Round, with agriculture as the clear culprit, was expected to spark serious backlash against the CAP, both within the Commission and among member state governments. Consistent with my framework, the critical situation of the CAP and the serious nature of the pressures driving reform broke with politics as usual and created an opportunity for MacSharry to propose and advocate for major reforms. Previous CAP reform efforts had only tinkered with the policy. The MacSharry Reform, however, occurred at a time of “disruptive politics”, which gave reformers an opening to alter the fundamental operation of the CAP. GATT pressures informed the content of the proposed reforms, facilitating the consideration of policies that made the CAP less trade distorting. The surplus-induced budgetary crisis allowed debate over policies that would affect both how farmers were supported and the ways in which production was managed and controlled. Crucially, however, while disruptive politics may have facilitated systemic CAP reform, they were not enough to produce cuts to the farmers’ bottom line. By the late 1980s, surplus production of core European goods, most notably cereals, beef, butter, and milk, contributed to a budget that was also growing out of control. Overproduction was so severe that the EU, having filled all of its existing stores, had taken to storing food on ships in the North Atlantic .

Vividly demonstrating the problem of excess production, DGVI, the Directorate General for Agriculture, actually calculated that with the butter on hand in storage, “the road between Brussels and the southern end of Italy could be buttered as though it were bread” . These stocks began to build up in the early 1970s as did exports onto an already stagnant world market . While production in the EU increased 2% annually between 1973 and 1988, consumption grew only 0.5% annually over the same period . Over a twelve-year period, from 1980- 1992, the CAP budget tripled . The collapse of the world cereals market in 1991 made matters even worse for CAP spending, as export refunds to the sector increased fourfold,vertical farming systems adding another 5-6 billion ECU10 to CAP expenditure . The Commission estimated that CAP spending would increase by a further 20% in 1992 . Virtually all of this money was dedicated to keeping pace with the main costs of the CAP, which related to surplus disposal: intervention purchases, storage costs, and export refunds. Moreover, despite the rapidly expanding CAP budget, the income gap between “the highly productive minority and the economically less efficient but socially more important [majority] continued to widen” . A core problem with which the CAP reform would have to contend was the traditional system of high prices paid to farmers for their products. Ironically, it was also damaging the ability of farmers, particularly grain farmers, to compete. Because prices were so high, grain farmers who produced cereals for animal consumption were losing market share to cheaper animal feed substitutes, whose prices were not set by the CAP. In addition to immediate concerns about surpluses and the sustainability of the budget, CAP spending threatened the impending transition to the single market as outlined under the recently signed Single European Act . With the accession of Greece, Portugal, and Spain and the reunification of Germany, economic disparities within the Union increased. Greece, Portugal, Spain, and East Germany were comparatively underdeveloped, lagging behind their fellow member states, particularly in infrastructure. In order to improve competitiveness and enhance harmonization among the member states, massive structural development investments were needed in these countries. EU leaders viewed these investments and income transfers as essential, preparing the poorer member states for entrance into the Single Market and eventually, a currency union . The current share of agricultural spending, roughly 80% of the total budget, was already seen as an impediment to creating a redistributive function in the budget and as posing a threat to meeting the objectives outlined in the SEA. If CAP production continued unchecked and spending on agriculture increased as projected, the EU would be unable to fund regional development programs, putting progress toward the Single Market at serious risk. Commitments to these structural programs could not be easily ignored or delayed. A 1988 agreement, complementary to the SEA, committed the EU to a doubling of structural funds by 1993 and further stipulated that those funds would be aimed at supporting the cohesion countries of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain .

For this reason, the general consensus was that the CAP budget could not be allowed to increase any further. Another major pressure to reform the CAP stemmed from the Uruguay Round negotiations of the GATT. Little progress had been made since the launching of the round in 1986 placed further pressure on the CAP. The preferences of the US along with the Cairns Group11 were diametrically opposed to those of the European Union. The US saw government support as the root of trouble in farm trade while the EU blamed the market . Specifically, the US called for dramatic liberalization primarily by reducing the protection and support afforded to European farmers under the CAP. The EU, however, argued that the aim of negotiations should be to “progressively reduce support to the extent necessary to reestablish balanced markets and a more market oriented agricultural trading system” but not to phase out support and protection entirely . The US, the Cairns Group, and many developing countries were frustrated by the lack of access to EU markets, privileged trade within the EU, and EU surplus dumping on world markets . If the talks failed, there was the very real threat that the EU would suffer retaliation from the Cairns Group . In December of 1990, GATT talks over agriculture completely collapsed at the Heysel Conference, which had been scheduled for the purpose of concluding the negotiations. The lack of progress in agriculture was a concern for all sectors. The agreement launching the UR stipulated that the round could not be formally concluded without an agreement in agriculture. By this time, key European leaders, most notably President of the European Commission Jacques Delors, French President François Mitterrand, and Chancellor of Germany Helmut Kohl, recognized that European farming interests were threatening the benefits that important sectors of the economy would realize from a new global trade agreement . Three areas of importance for the EU and its member states, trade, services, and intellectual property rights, stood to benefit significantly from the agreement. American domestic politics added a sense of urgency to finding an agreement in agriculture. The coming election presented the possibility that Bill Clinton, who had already expressed a desire to re-evaluate the US stance, would succeed George H. W. Bush. In addition, Congress’ “fast-track authority”, which requires Congress to accept or reject an international agreement in its entirety quickly and without altering the substance, was set to expire in 1993 . Given the position of the EU relative to the other major negotiating parties in the GATT, it was clear that CAP reform was required in order to reach an agreement on agriculture and thus conclude the Uruguay Round. Agricultural Commissioner Raymond “Ray” MacSharry knew, however, that he could not openly and directly link his CAP reforms to the GATT UR. Connecting CAP reform to the GATT would lead to the perception among the public and member state representatives in the Council of Ministers that “reforms were being made for the benefit of the Americans” . If the perception that CAP reform was being done for the sake of a GATT agreement took hold, MacSharry knew that his “reforms would be dead in the water” . For this reason, the reform package was presented as being constructed to deal with problems related to the budget and surplus production only . Any consequences these reforms might have for the GATT negotiations were, ostensibly, secondary. The combination of pressures confronting the CAP at the time of MacSharry’s reform, most notably concerns related to the GATT and how budget overruns would affect the SEA, meant that reformers were operating at a time of “disruptive politics”.

These tactics include: obscuring cuts or spreading them out over time; imposing retrenchment on only one segment of agricultural producers; and coupling cuts with side-payments or measures to make the CAP more equitable.The influence of farmers today stems from several sources including: organizations, public opinion, control of the policy space, and the nature of agricultural production. Each source provides farmers with access to and influence over agricultural policy making. Together, they make it difficult for those seeking to reform the CAP, whether technocrats or environmentalists, to override farmer preferences. Farmers in advanced industrialized countries are generally organized into and represented by a single organization, though sectoral and rival organizations do exist. The organizations have strong membership rates, an impressive capacity to mobilize their membership, and well disciplined and tightly coordinated sub-national branches. Examples of these farmer organizations include France’s Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d’Exploitants Agricoles , the Netherlands’ Land- en Tuinbouw Organisatie and the UK’s National Farmers’ Union . The FNSEA has over 320,000 members, representing well over 50% of France’s farming population. There are also a number of smaller French farmer representative organizations, including the Coordination Rurale, with roughly 15,000 members, the Confédération Paysanne,vertical farming technology with about 10,000 adherents, and MODEF the communist-leaning organization created to be a dissenting voice to the FNSEA, which has, at most, a few thousand members . The Dutch LTO organizes just under 70% of farmers. Finally, the NFU represents roughly 75% of all farmers in the United Kingdom . The Comité des Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles is the umbrella organization that represents all of the member states’ farmer unions to the European Union.

It is the supranational lobby organization whose presidency rotates among the heads of the national farming unions. Combining the membership of all the constituent unions, COPA represents roughly 13 million farmers. Both the FNSEA and LTO are multi-tiered organizations that have local and regional branches united under a single national office. The NFU, meanwhile, is divided into three main branches, one representing England and Wales , another Scotland , and the third Northern Ireland . The three main branches, like the French and Dutch farmers’ unions, have many more regional and local offices. NFU England and Wales typically takes the lead in representing the NFU supranationally in consultation with the Scottish and Northern Irish branches. While certain types of farming may be concentrated in particular regions, farming in general is undertaken nationwide, meaning that farmers are professionally organized across the entire country. This type of organizational structure is distinct from that of most other interest groups, such as trade unions. Other interest organizations often lack either local-level representation throughout the country or tight coordination between national and sub–national branches. Country-wide coordination between national and sub–national branches permits farmer organizations to be actively engaged in political discussions at all levels of government. As one local politician from the Netherlands noted, the LTO has representatives at every single council meeting and is the only representative organization, professional or otherwise, that regularly attends . This strong presence in local politics allows farmers to form tight bonds with key local actors and shape the ways that important policies are implemented at the local level.In addition to regularly participating in local and regional politics, farmer organizations routinely engage with national politicians of the left and the right in the capital and in their home constituency. For example, a member of the left wing of the Assemblée Nationale stated that he had “regular monthly meetings” with representatives of the FNSEA while a member of the right leaning Les Républicains noted that he “meets regularly with [the FNSEA] and helps them advance legislative texts”3 .

The effect of regular contact with politicians locally and nationally is maximized in cases such as France where politicians hold multiple mandates. For example, a member of the parliament can also be a mayor. Multiple mandates allow farmers to lobby politicians in two capacities, as both a national and local office-holder. Local lobbying can be particularly powerful because of the additional pressure that the national government can put on local officials to keep their towns in order and minimize conflict. The influence of the farmer organizations is not just limited to national farmers’ unions. Other lobbying organizations include agricultural research centers or institutes, universities, such as the highly regarded Wageningen University in the Netherlands, and representative organizations, similar to the national farmers’ lobbies, that focus on one crop. In addition to their national offices, these sectoral organizations, such as the Association Générale des Producteurs de Blé in France, typically maintain offices in Brussels, allowing them to lobby directly about those aspects of the CAP that are most important to their constituents. In France, the broader farming lobby also includes the Chambres d’Agriculture. France is divided into 18 regions , with each region further divided into multiple departments , for a total of 94 across mainland France. Each département has its own Chambre d’Agriculture . Each région also has its own Chambre d’Agriculture, with the regional representatives coming from the chambres départementales. Finally, the 94 Chambres d’Agriculture are organized nationally into the Assemblée Permanente des Chambres d’Agriculture . The collective Chambres d’Agriculture thus afford the French farming community yet another avenue through which to lobby the government and influence policy at the departmental, regional, and national levels. Another source of influence for farmer organizations is their monopoly on expert knowledge. Agricultural policy is incredibly complex- both to create and even to understand . As a result, government representatives and officials, and even sometimes the ministry of agriculture, will rely on the research centers, technical institutes, or various national and sectoral representative organizations to provide expert advice, research, and data on various aspects of agricultural policy.

The government’s reliance on these organizations affords the broader farming lobby even more political power and influence. On all matters of agricultural policy, including creation and reform, the government is very dependent on farmer organizations for both expert advice and implementation. This dependence allows farmers to wield more influence than other interlocutors. For example, they can reject non-preferred alternatives as implausible or difficult to implement. In addition,vertical tower planter the government’s reliance on the expertise of farmer organizations in the research and policy development phase affords these groups privileged access and a first mover advantage; they can exert influence before other actors gain access to the debate. Sometimes, due to their expert knowledge farmers and their representative organizations are permitted to implement policies, creating further opportunities for them to shape the policy. A third source of political power and influence is the relationship between farmers and the public. Public opinion data demonstrate that Europe’s farmers benefit from a sympathetic public. According to the 2014 Eurobarometer survey, only 17% of French respondents think CAP spending is too high, while 69% believe spending is at the right level or too low. In general, the French public is supportive of its farmers and takes great pride in the myriad specialized wines, cheese, and other foodstuffs they produce. French farmer organizations, like the FNSEA have recognized that the farmers’ relationship with the public can be a powerful source of political influence. Indeed, the FNSEA routinely manipulates public opinion to serve its purposes. Often, its marketing highlights the plight of the small, family farmer while its political lobbying tends to privilege the interests of the large cereals producers. As Table 1.1 illustrates, strong public sympathy for farmers is not confined to countries like France. British farmers also benefit from a positive and sympathetic relationship with the public. According to the most recent Eurobarometer survey , only 16% of the British public believes that CAP spending is too high, while 72% believes that CAP spending is at the right level, or too low. This strong support for the CAP is all the more surprising given the British context. A series of public health scares have given British farmers a particularly bad reputation . In addition, the general public in the UK is among the most Euroskeptical in the EU. The belief that the UK pays far more into the EU than it gets out is widespread and contributed to the Brexit vote and the UK’s decision to leave the Union. Despite past issues with food safety and growing Euroskepticism, the British public maintains something of a soft spot for the CAP and for British farmers more broadly. A sympathetic public can be a key tool for the farmer lobby, and is one that many farmer organizations commit significant resources to maintaining . Favorable public opinion permits farmers to take disruptive action without concern for push back from those who are inconvenienced.

It also allows farmers to demand a high price for their products because publics are willing to pay more to subsidize domestic production. Finally, public sympathy gives politicians the political cover necessary to direct costly programs of aid to an already heavily funded and small portion of the population instead of towards more economically promising sectors or other needy social groups. The ways in which farmers produce and the type of products that they cultivate allow farmers to marshal a wide range of arguments for continuing agricultural income assistance. When farmers are small or inefficient producers, the narrative of caring for farmers in need and investing in small-family enterprises is advanced. Appeals are also made to sustain and preserve traditional rural life and practices. These arguments tie into a desire to protect a country’s rural heritage. When farms are large and efficient, aid is justified on different grounds. Farming is presented as a successful sector, generating jobs and exports and serving as the foundation for the much larger food industry, which includes processing and shipping. It can also be a source of pride or cultural influence for high-end products like cheese or wine. These arguments associate support for farmers with the protection of national culinary traditions and the defense of the culinary patrimony of the nation. Control of the policy space is a fourth and final source of political power and influence for farmers. The EU’s Directorate General for Agriculture which is responsible for developing and implementing CAP policy, is not only bigger than any other directorate, but also has effectively managed to isolate the agricultural policy making process , Keeler , and Knudsen. In CAP negotiations, the agricultural commissioner is the only one actively involved in the meetings. Other commissioners who may have an interest in the outcome of negotiations, like those for trade, budget and finance, competition, the environment, health and food safety, and competition are not party to the negotiations. In addition to excluding other commissioners, control of the policy space also keeps out groups representing other interests such as consumers, industry, and environmentalists. The exclusion of other actors allows agricultural interests to further dominate policy debates, while potential opponents, and the dissenting or alternative perspectives they can offer, are marginalized. Agricultural policy is similarly isolated in trade negotiations. In the Uruguay Round of the GATT, for example, the agricultural component of the agreement was negotiated separately from the rest of the trade deal. In addition, interviews with members of national legislators across countries, including the UK, Netherlands, and France, reveal that, when making agricultural policy, little effort is made to reach out to and incorporate other groups who may be interested in reform outcomes such as environmental or consumer groups . Instead, they consult agricultural interests almost exclusively. By controlling the policy space, agricultural interests can ensure that their preferences are voiced, while potential opponents have little or no opportunity to participate in policy making. Though farmers have seen their numbers decline, they have been able to preserve their influence. Organizations help farmers mobilize for collective action and access policymakers at all levels of the political system. Sympathetic publics permit farmers to ask for policies that are often burdensome for the consumer and tax payer. Control of the policy space prevents opponents from challenging farmers’ policy preferences and putting forward alternative reforms. Finally, the nature of agricultural production allows farmers to advance a variety of arguments about the continued relevance of the agricultural sector. Ultimately, these are the sources of influence that reformers must navigate and that have helped farmers avoid the political irrelevance they seemed destined for as their economic and demographic power declined.

This information is provided to allow the reader to have ready access to trade data in a form that facilitates consideration of export gains for California agriculture. The bottom line is that the KORUS FTA would make U.S. products relatively cheaper in Korea and, as a result, the Korean market for U.S. products would expand. Further, the larger difference in tariffs on agricultural goods means that there is substantial potential for gains from the KORUS FTA in agricultural trade for the United States and California.The United States and South Korea formally announced their intention to start negotiations leading to a free trade agreement on February 2, 2006. After negotiation sessions in Washington, D.C., and Seoul, follow-up meetings were held in Seattle, Washington, and on Jeju Island in South Korea in late October 2006. The negotiations were very strenuous given the complexity of trade relations between the two countries coupled with the short deadline to conclude the negotiations . In the United States, negotiations were authorized under trade promotion authority legislation. The most recent trade promotion negotiation authority was granted to the president under the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002 and expired on July 1, 2007 . The TPA requires a 90-day presidential notification to Congress of intent to sign the agreement. The KORUS FTA was finalized on the last possible day, April 1, 2007, and on June 30, 2007, trade officials representing the United States and South Korea signed it. Once an agreement is signed, the U.S. Congress must pass implementing legislation before the trade agreement can take effect. There is no binding deadline for such legislation and implementation of FTAs has often been delayed until long after the agreements were signed. Under the TPA legislation, Congress must either pass or reject an agreement as signed and may not amend it. Trade observers consider this provision a requirement for any trade negotiation to proceed.

Clearly,vertical farming tower for sale trading partners would find it futile to negotiate with the United States if the agreement reached could subsequently be unilaterally changed by Congress. Besides the World Trade Organization negotiations in the Doha Round, the United States has used TPA to engage in free trade initiatives in the western hemisphere, East Asia, Oceania, the Middle East, North Africa, and southern Africa. The United States has completed free trade agreements with Canada, Mexico, Singapore, Central America-5 , Israel, Australia, Chile, Jordan, and Morocco and has signed an FTA with the Dominican Republic, Peru, Oman, and Bahrain .2 Under a simple definition, an FTA is a pact between or among two or more countries under which tariffs and similar non-tariff border restrictions are eliminated among the parties to the agreement. Many, if not all, FTAs achieve less than full free trade. Even when barriers are removed, the gradual scheduling of liberalization and other rules make the agreements complex . Korea has FTAs with Chile , Singapore , ASEAN-10 , and EFTA-4 . Korea has negotiations under consideration with Japan, Canada, Mexico, and India .3 Korea is also considering FTAs with New Zealand and Australia . Korea’s existing FTAs allow only limited access for agricultural trade. For example, the Korean FTA with the ASEAN-10, signed in May 2006, excluded a number of agricultural items, including rice . Previous Korean FTAs also contained provisions intended for gradual market opening, such as schedules for phasing out tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Furthermore, those FTAs granted a preferential status to the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which houses South Korean companies near the North Korean city of Kaesong. Likewise, previous FTAs signed by the United States have included tariff reduction schedules and provisions for dispute resolution and related issues. Even though the United States and Korea have been political allies for many decades, they have a history of trade disputes that goes back long before the WTO entered into force in January 1995.

Since 1995, the two countries have fi led thirteen cases involving bilateral trade problems, seven by the United States and six by Korea. Six of the seven U.S. cases against Korea have involved problems with non-tariff protection in agriculture .South Korea has experienced phenomenal change in the last half century. It has gone from an extremely poor agrarian economy using nineteenth century technology at best to a wealthy modern society at the cutting edge of applied science and with some of the world’s most advanced technological firms dominating the economic landscape. In two generations, Korea went through changes that took 100 years or more in the United States and Europe. As GDP doubled and then doubled again and again, annual income went from only a few hundred dollars per capita to more than $20,000 per capita today. Meanwhile, manufacturing and services expanded and the share of agriculture in the economy declined from about 30% in 1970 to a little more than 3% now. The changes in dietary patterns in Korea were equally rapid. As recently as 1982, about 32% of monthly food expenditures went to cereal consumed at home. By 2005, that share had fallen to just 6%. Consumption of all other products at home, except processed products, has also fallen somewhat while food consumed away from home has jumped from just 6% of monthly expenditures to about 46% . The huge shift in expenditures on food away from home also indicates the nature of Korean society, in which most people live in urban apartments. They spend long hours away from home involved in school, work, commuting, and other activities. Of course, many of the food expenditures away from home are for food preparation and related services that are not included in food costs for home consumption. The same issues are reflected in data for the United States, where expenditures away from home have risen rapidly in recent decades. The rapid change in the Korean diet may also be gleaned from changes in nutrient consumption. In 1980, fully 75% of Korean calorie intake came from carbohydrates while 12% came from protein and 13% came from fat. By 2004, carbohydrate intake had fallen to 61% of calories and fat had risen to 26% .

The increased fat intake has been driven by increased consumption of meat and dairy products and the greater role of processed snacks and other processed foods in the diet. It also reflects the different composition of food consumed away from home. In the context of this economic and social revolution, agriculture has changed but not to the degree that industrial and service economies have. Under tight protection from imports,hydroponic vertical farm rice continued and even expanded as the dominant crop with 37% of acreage devoted to rice in 1970 and about 50% currently. Horticultural production has expanded substantially while barley and potato acreages have declined. The arable land devoted to fruit production has expanded from about 2% in 1970 to 8% today and greenhouse production grew from almost nothing to 2% of arable land . The dairy and beef industries have expanded to meet part of the increased domestic demand. Farm size has grown slowly in Korea but remains far below the average farm size of other industrial economies other than Japan. Korean agriculture has been like Japanese agriculture in another characteristic as well: protection from imports has kept much of agriculture insulated from competitive pressures from abroad, helped maintain rice as the dominant crop, and relied on high prices rather than farm size increases as the mechanism by which to maintain farm incomes relative to non-farm incomes. Per capita farm income in Korea grew along with the national average until the last decade. Since the early 1990s, per capita income of the farm population went from rough parity with the non-farm population to about 80% of non-farm incomes today . At the same time, a demographic transformation has occurred in the age pattern of the farm population . In 1970, more than 50% of the farm population was less than 20 years of age and only about 5% of the population was older than 65. In 2004, about 30% of the population was older than 65 and only about 15% was under 20 . This huge and rapid shift means that there are few young families with children left among farm families. There will be a huge turnover among farmers and, given the lack of successors available, farm consolidation is inevitable.Table 1.b reports the value of total merchandise trade for the two countries for the period 2000–2007. The United States incurred a significant trade deficit each year, while Korea has produced a trade surplus each year. The United States trades much more than Korea; in 2007, U.S. total trade was more than four times Korean trade in value. However, considering the relative size of the economy, it is important to note that trade has a more significant role in the Korean economy. In 2007, annual trade totaled about one quarter of U.S. GDP but about 80% for Korea. For the period 2000–2007, U.S. exports to Korea averaged close to $26 billion and about 3% of total U.S. exports go to Korea. U.S. merchandise exports to Korea declined sharply in 2001 but bounced back gradually, reaching the pre-slump level by 2005. During 2006/07, U.S. exports rose substantially, reaching $33 billion.

In the same year, Korea was the seventh largest export market for the United States. Major export items from the United States to Korea include semiconductor chips, manufacturing equipment, aircraft, and agricultural goods. Korea is equally important as a source for U.S. imports as it is the seventh largest import source. Consistent with the overall U.S. trade deficit, the United States incurs a deficit in bilateral trade with Korea. The trade deficit was $14 billion at the beginning of the century and has remained in the range of $12 to $14 billion in recent years. Even though U.S. exports to Korea grew substantially, U.S. imports from Korea also increased and the trade deficit has changed little. Almost all imports from Korea are manufactured goods. Unlike the United States, which has run a trade deficit overall for decades, Korea has run a trade surplus for many years. However, the trade surplus in general is not large—about 5% of the country’s exports—because Korea has to rely on foreign sources for much its raw materials. Over the time period considered, Korea expanded trade rapidly, doubling exports as well as imports. Consistent with the global importance of the U.S. economy, the United States represents a much larger proportion of Korean trade than Korea does of U.S. trade. In 2007 Korea represented, at most, 3% of U.S. trade as a buyer of U.S. goods and as a seller in the U.S. market. During that same year, the United States had about 9% of the Korean market and about 12% of total exports by Korea were destined for the United States. Korea’s trade has been dominated mostly by three countries: the United States, China, and Japan. in a similar magnitude for both imports and exports as the United States but the EU is excluded from the list of individual countries.Prior to 2000, Japan and the United States traded the position of top source of imports into Korea. However, since 2000, Japanese exports to Korea have surpassed U.S. exports and Japan has remained as the top source of Korean imports. With the emergence of China, the United States’ relative position in Korea declined further. As shown in Table 1.c, since 2004 China has replaced the United States as the second source of Korean imports after Japan. China also is the largest market for Korean goods, having replaced the United States in 2003. Major Korean exports to the United States include cellular phones, cars, semiconductor circuits, televisions, fl at panel screens, and construction vehicles .Agricultural goods are important export commodities in the United States. Table 1.d provides values of agricultural trade for the United States and Korea for recent years. In 2007, agricultural trade occupied about 9% of U.S. merchandise exports and 4% of merchandise imports . The U.S. agricultural sector consistently produces a trade surplus and contributes to reducing the trade deficit .

Whether these ameliorants, or sorbents, such as zeolites or biochar, are effective agronomic treatments will depend on the system’s vulnerability to N losses. Experiments in controlled conditions have shown that sorbents can optimize NH+ 4 release considerably . Other technological interventions currently available include plastic mulch, now in widespread use in parts of China . While developed as a water conservation measure, plastic also heats soil and thereby accelerates N mineralization as the growing season progresses . However, the long term application of plastic mulching can lead to pollution that damages soil health and threatens long-term food security . Manipulating the microbes responsible for soil N cycling could be a fruitful frontier for future research. We are only now learning the functional importance of the myriad plant microbe associations that form the plant microbiome, and emerging evidence that plants can stimulate rhizosphere microbes to oxidize soil carbon implies that plants might also be bred or engineered to harness the micro-biome for N release. Or that the micro-biome might be intentionally composed to include microbes capable of mineralizing soil organic N when triggered by plant N demand. Additionally, slow-release N fertilizers or even cover crops might be created with an enhanced ability to release organic N when similarly triggered. Management of fertilizer N in paddy soils is notoriously difficult due to loss of N through NH3 volatilization from the floodwaters. The deep placement of urea granules is one technology to enhance N capture by rice and reduce losses, although demanding in terms of labor . Climate mitigation practices to reduce methane emissions from paddy rice call for periodic drainage ,raspberry cultivation pot which will make N management all the more difficult as organic N mineralizes to NH+ 4 that will then undergo nitrification to NO− 3 during drained periods with subsequent loss via denitrification upon re-wetting.

Losses can be mitigated with management that avoids the presence of excessive mineral N pools in the soil at these high risk time periods, such as split N applications, retaining crop residue, and keeping N balances in check.Precision agriculture is a farm management approach that seeks to identify practices that optimize the use of farm inputs . As a result, precision management relies on technologies that enable intensive data collection, processing, and evaluation needed to properly characterize and synthesize temporal and spatial variability. Theoretically, the variance in yield and environmental outcomes is attributable to measurable climatic, edaphic, and management factors. Precision agriculture is not exclusively focused upon N management, but improving NUE is a common goal given the potential variance of crop N demand across the landscape and with time. Site-specific management can help tailor N applications, improve NUE, increase profits, and/or minimize risk of N loss . NUE, as a performance outcome, can also be used to evaluate management decisions in fields characterized by high spatial and temporal variability in biophysical conditions . Coincidently, a cornerstone of tactical N management is fine-tuning in-season N management to meet crop N needs based upon the status of the plant. For example, the N nutritional index can be used to determine whether the crop N concentration is sub-optimal relative to the critical N dilution curve at maximum yield , while the N sufficiency index can assess status by referencing a well-fertilized area . A rapid, non-destructive assessment of field or sub-field NUE depends upon the remote or proximal sensing tools and algorithms that reliably monitor N concentrations in the crop . The working assumption is that crop N sufficiency status is functionally related to plant N either expressed as a concentration or accumulation in the leaf or plant. Though not always consistent across growth stage and fertilizer rate, chlorophyll or protein indicators can be used as proxies for N status due to the strong relationship between Ncontaining compounds and N content .

Many different vegetation indices are widely used to estimate crop N content or accumulation, alleviating confounding factors from soils or water, which are generally calculated from the leaf or canopy reflectance values of wavebands in the visible and near infrared regions . Rapid developments in sensing technologies coupled with machine learning have increased our abilities to accurately predict yield and non-destructively estimate plant N status . However, challenges persist for practitioners , including the influence of growth stage, cultivars, and N management across space and time, as well as the limitation imposed as indices approach saturation levels. Furthermore, canopy sensing data is often instantaneous, infrequent, and does not capture the N status of the entire plant , thus potentially missing dynamic N behavior in the plant pertinent to making timely recommendations. To combat these limitations, Fu et al. recommends that hyperspectral data be integrated with crop growth models and radiative transfer models to improve assessments. The variance in crop and soil data can also be used to delineate sub-field management zones through the combination of sensing, geostatistical, and interpolation techniques . However, when developing site specific N recommendations, precision agriculture tools must also account for the dynamic nature of soil N and crop uptake efficiencies across landscapes . Furthermore, recommendations that rely primarily on vegetation indices cannot guide pre-planting or pre-emergent N decisions. Therefore, an integrative site specific N management approach links georeferenced decision support models to dynamic biogeochemical models that simulate outcomes based upon relevant crop, soil, weather, management, and enterprise factors . Models that simulate N status can then be validated through field measurements collected throughout the growing season. Therefore, precision agriculture technologies are compatible within an adaptive N management framework, in which site specific empirical data is used to improve model accuracy on a field or sub-field level . Ultimately, data from these various sources can be fused through machine learning or other techniques to provide on-the-go assessments and automated recommendations . Crop sensing and georeferenced management data could be used to calculate and map NUE spatially and temporally for assessment purposes. As a performance indicator, NUE can help evaluate fertilizer management within the context of yield and crop quality goals, and even diagnose factors contributing to inefficiencies of fertilizer use . As an environmental indicator, NUE estimates can help farmers assess the risk of N losses from farms or fields, or relative to regional or supply chain estimates .

Variable rate N fertilizer technology could substantially reduce N losses by matching the low plant N demand in low fertility sub-field areas with appropriately reduced fertilizer rates,low round pots as could planting these areas to perennial conservation or bio-energy species. With current technology, the best way to capture unused N after the main crop’s growing season is by using cover crops planted to grow quickly following senescence of the main crop. The N that cover crops remove from the soil solution is N that is not lost to the environment and instead can be remobilized from cover crop biomass to provide N to the following year’s main crop. Although plants cannot use atmospheric N2 directly, it has been known for over a century that diverse bacteria and archaea, known as diazotrophs, can convert atmospheric N2 to NH3 through BNF and that the NH3 produced can be utilized directly or indirectly by plants for growth . Diazotrophs can be found in bulk soil, within the rhizosphere of plants, physically-associated with plant roots and other organs, and even inside plants within specialized, N fixing organs called nodules . Rates of BNF by free-living diazotrophs in soil are typically low, between 1 and 20 kg N ha−1 yr−1 , although associative N fixation by microbes in the rhizosphere or on plant surfaces may contribute significantly to plant growth in low-N input systems . In contrast, BNF in nodules is highly efficient, and in high-yield environments can exceed 300 kg N ha−1 yr−1 as nutrient exchange between plants and their intracellular bacterial endosymbionts is highly targeted , avoiding losses of plant-C and bacterialammonia to the soil and associated microbiome. However, BNF in nodules is confined largely to legumes and a few nonlegume plant families , while most crop species, including cereals, are unable to access atmospheric N2 in this way. The escalating global N problem has sparked renewed interest in BNF as a partial solution, deployable through: development and use of legumes and rhizobia with increased BNF potential; development of more-effective associative N fixation in non-legumes, especially the major cereals; and potentially through the engineering of nodule symbioses or even plants capable of fixing their own N . BNF in grain legumes remains an important source of N in many cropping systems, where it contributes to higher NUE, although the relative contribution of legumes in agriculture has declined with the increase in N fertilizer use. This was partly due to the emphasis on cereal production in the policies of the Green Revolution, which replaced traditional cereal-legume crop rotations in countries like India, leading to scarcity of grain legumes and even imports from Africa . Therefore, there is tremendous scope to increase the contribution of legume BNF to agriculture, via systems agronomy and plant breeding approaches , and by improving the effectiveness and resilience of rhizobium strains used as inoculants . Growing legumes, as grain or green manure crops, and recycling shoot biomass to the soil generally improves soil fertility, increases the yield of the subsequent crop, and reduces the requirement for synthetic N.

Many reports cite more grain production in cereals grown after a legume, than after a nonlegume or after a fallow . Legumes are often used in short-term rotation, such as cornsoybean, or in continuous corn with a legume winter cover crop. These systems offer farmers many benefits, and help to solve environmental problems associated with N use in agriculture. In many developing regions of the world, legumes are used extensively to meet protein requirements. Nevertheless, in past decades, the widespread availability of synthetic Nfertilizer and low yields of legumes relative to cereals have resulted either in a stagnation or a decrease in the area under cultivation of legumes in different regions . There are several environmental and economic constraints limiting legume yield and profitability that may be responsible for a decrease in legume cultivation. In a recent review, Vanlauwe et al. argued that although considerable progress has been made in understanding grain legume agronomy, the relationship between legumes and rhizobia populations, the benefits of BNF to farming systems, and the spatial and temporal integration of legumes in these systems are important knowledge gaps that prevent the formulation of recommendations that would further enhance the contributions of legumes to farming systems in Sub-Saharan Africa . They recommend integration of BNF in breeding programs and improvements in overall agronomy to maximize the potential of symbiosis through eliminating various soil and other environmental constraints. Legumes are also an attractive option for mixed-crop systems where two crop species are grown simultaneously in the same field. But despite advantages of inter cropping that include greater resource use efficiency, including NUE, inter cropping remains ‘at the fringes of modern intensive agriculture’ . This may change when the benefits of inter cropping are realized, with a recent estimate that globally increased NUE of cereal-legume inter cropping reduces the requirements for fossil based fertilizer N by about 26% . Challenges will include planting using the same implements, weed management, and harvesting. There is growing interest in the development of effective associative N fixation for cereal crops, especially maize, rice, and wheat , and as well for perennial forage and bio-energy grasses . These range from simply isolating, testing, and deploying the most effective natural plant-associated diazotrophs of target plant species, based primarily on plant growth promotion , to current attempts to edit the genomes of such bacteria to remove genetic controls that prevent N fixation and NH3 release in agricultural soils containing potentially high levels of mineral and organic-N . Decades of genetic, genomic, and biochemical research and technology development provide a basis for attempts to edit or engineer diazotrophs for optimal association with non-legumes . However, it is difficult to estimate small amounts of BNF in the field and many recent claims of large amounts of fixed N in cereals result from flawed application of measurement methods .

Studies in the California Delta have suggested that while C loss and subsidence rates have both been declining over time relative to the rapid losses after initial drainage, the relative importance of SOM mineralization losses has been increasing. Deverel and Leighton estimated that 67% of subsidence since 1995 could be attributed to SOM losses on a neighboring Delta island, a value which agrees with work from other drained peat lands showing an increase in the relative importance of mineralization over time.The estimated annual subsidence by this method was 0.11 cm yr-1 at Site 1 and 0.07 cm yr-1 at Site 2. Some caution is needed, however, in interpreting these subsidence estimates because of the assumptions involved in calculating them, particularly the use of the soil bulk density and fraction of subsidence due to SOM loss. Yet these results are in close agreement with Hatala et al. who estimated 0.10–0.14 cm yr-1 subsidence loss at this site using eddy covariance tower measurements to develop and C budget. Both these studies suggest that rice systems reduce subsidence relative to regional averages of 1–3 cm yr-1, and rates measured in a maize field at the same site of 2.5 cm yr-1. Our analysis also indicates that after the first four years since conversion to rice agriculture, seasonal flooding is however not adequate to achieve soil gains similar to those observed in constructed wetlands. Measuring subsidence directly in a dynamic, intensely managed agricultural system is difficult,hydroponic net pots and thus all methods provide only estimates. Methods using extensometers to estimate the surface elevation relative to fixed anchors [c.f. 16] require specialized equipment and many years to examine a trend in the data.

In this context, using this N budget approach may be preferable as it is less resource intensive and can easily be integrated with a farmer’s management practices on a small portion of land, and further study that could refine bulk density and consolidation measurements including an assessment of temporal change in these factors would be valuable to more directly link SOM-N mineralization estimates with ongoing subsidence in the field.alifornia has led the nation in farm sales since 1950, largely because of the state’s specialization in high-value fruit and vegetable crops. California’s farm sales of $54 billion in 2014 included $20.8 billion worth of fruits and nuts, $8.3 billion worth of vegetables and melons and $5.4 billion worth of horticultural specialties such as greenhouse and nursery products. The value of field crops such as cotton, hay and rice was $4 billion, making crop sales of $38 billion almost three-fourths of the state’s farm sales. Livestock and poultry sales were $16 billion, including $9 billion from milk. Fruit, vegetable and horticultural crops accounted for 90% of the state’s crop sales and two-thirds of its farm sales. The production of many fruits and vegetables is relatively labor intensive, with labor representing 20% to 40% of production costs. California growers reported paying $11.4 billion in wages in 2014, making labor costs over 20% of farm sales. Almost 45% of these labor costs was for support activities for crop production, primarily payments to farm labor contractors, custom harvesters and other non–farm businesses that bring workers to farms. Hired workers, rather than self-employed farm operators and their families, do most of the work on the state’s largest farms that produce almost all labor-intensive FVH crops. Most California farm workers were born in Mexico, and 60% of crop workers employed on the state’s crop farms have been unauthorized for the past decade, according to the National Agricultural Workers Survey, which is 10 percentage points higher than the U.S. average of 50%.

Farm employers say that farm workers present seemingly valid documentation and Social Security numbers when they are hired, so they do not know who is unauthorized. Several factors, including increased production of labor-intensive crops, a tightening of border controls that has slowed arrivals of new farm workers, and proposals to give some unauthorized foreigners a temporary legal status, have intensified interest in current and future farm workers, with farm employers arguing that there are farm labor shortages and worker advocates countering that there is only a shortage of wages to attract and retain farm workers. While California regularly reports the number of jobs on farms across the state, it does not report the number of wage and salary workers who fill them. Our objective was to provide a clearer picture of California’s agricultural workforce by determining the actual number of wage and salary workers in agriculture.The state’s Employment Development Department obtains data on farm workers and wages paid when it collects unemployment insurance taxes from employers. Employers who pay more than $100 in quarterly wages are required to register with the EDD and pay taxes of up to 6% on the first $7,000 of each worker’s earnings to cover the cost of unemployment insurance benefits for laid-off workers. We extracted all wage and salary workers reported by California agricultural employers in 2014 and tabulated all of their farm and non–farm jobs and earnings in the state; we excluded wage and salary workers in forestry, fishing and hunting. This allowed us to assign workers with more than one job to their primary industry, that is, to the NAICS code of the employer where they had their maximum earnings. We excluded about 800 SSNs because of apparent problems, such as excessive number of jobs reported in a quarter .Average employment on the state’s farms is derived from employer reports of workers on the payroll for the pay period that includes the 12th of the month. Most farm workers are paid weekly, so an average 410,900 workers employed in 2014 means that this is the average employment of workers on agricultural payrolls during the second week of the month. Workers employed during the month but not during the payroll period that includes the 12th are not included in published average employment data because it is a monthly snapshot, summed and divided by 12 months. Our analysis, however, captures these additional workers because we obtain data on all wage and salary workers hired by agricultural employers at any time, including farm workers, managers and office workers.

Figure 1 shows average employment in California agriculture since 1990. Average employment rose 10%, reflecting a decline in direct-hire employment on crop farms , stable employment in animal agriculture , and a 50% increase in crop support employment , most of which is with farm labor contractors. Since 2010, average employment reported by crop support establishments has been rising by 10,000 a year, so that in 2014 non–farm crop support firms brought more workers to crop farms, an average of over 205,000, than crop farms hired directly, 175,000. In 2014, two-thirds of average employment in crop support services, 207,600, involved farm labor contractors. Very few workers are employed in livestock support services. Average employment can be considered to be an estimate of full-time equivalent jobs, but it is not the total number of farm workers. When average employment in California agriculture was 410,900 in 2014, there were 829,000 unique SSNs reported by agricultural establishments, a two-to-one worker-to-job ratio . In 2012,blueberry grow pot when average employment was 395,400, there were 802,600 unique SSNs, also a two-to-one worker-to-job ratio. There was a similar two-to-one ratio of workers to average jobs in 2007. The 829,000 people employed in agriculture during 2014 earned $11.4 billion from agricultural employers and another $4.5 billion from non-farm employers. Average earnings for all workers with at least one farm employer were over $19,000 in 2014, while average earnings for workers who had their maximum earnings in agriculture were $16,500, up almost 8% from $15,300 in 2012. The California jobs of the workers reported by California farm employers can be tabulated, and workers can be assigned to the NAICS or commodity in which they had the highest earnings. For example, approximately 692,000 of the 829,000 workers employed in agriculture had their highest earnings from a farm employer in 2014, and 499,000 of these primary farm workers had only one agricultural employer . In 2014, the crop support and fruit and nut sectors had the lowest average earnings, with $12,719 for crop support and $17,600 for fruits and nuts. This explains why the overall average earnings of primary farm workers were only $16,500 even though all commodities except crop support and fruit and nut had higher average earnings, such as the $29,223 average earnings in cattle ranching. Over three-fourths of the $11.4 billion in agricultural earnings were from three NAICS codes: 1151 crop support activities , 1113 fruits and nuts and 1112 vegetables . Other major sources of agricultural earnings were NAICS 1114 greenhouses and nurseries and 1121 cattle and dairy .

By assigning all of the state’s 829,300 farm workers to the NAICS code of the employer where they had maximum earnings in 2014, we identified several groups. First, almost 692,000 of farm workers had their maximum earnings from agricultural establishments, including 392,000 whose maximum earnings were from NAICS 1151 crop support establishments, 154,000 whose maximum earnings were from NAICS 1113 fruit and nut establishments and 45,000 whose maximum earnings were from NAICS 1112 vegetable establishments. There are over 20 agricultural NAICS codes, but three sectors — crop support firms , fruit and nut farms, and vegetable and melon farms — accounted for 85% of all primary farm workers in 2014. Second, almost 500,000 farm workers, or 72% of primary farm workers, had only one job in 2014, meaning that three-fourths of workers whose maximum earnings were from agricultural establishments worked for only one agricultural employer in California. These “one-farm employer” workers were in the same three types of establishments as all primary farm workers: 288,000 were in NAICS 1151 crop support establishments, 103,000 were in NAICS 1113 fruit and nut establishments and 31,000 were in NAICS 1112 vegetable establishments. A closer look at workers whose maximum earnings were in particular NAICS codes found that 103,000, or two-thirds of the 154,000 directly hired fruit and nut workers, were employed by just one fruit and nut establishment. Similarly, over 288,000, or almost three-fourths of the 392,000 workers whose maximum earnings were in crop support, had only one crop-support employer, although crop support employees may work on multiple farms during the year. Over three-fourths of workers in livestock production were employed by one livestock establishment. Third, there were 94,000 primary farm workers with at least two farm employers in 2014. Of these, half had their maximum earnings from NAICS 1151 crop support establishments , but only an eighth of crop support workers had two farm employers. About 20% of those whose maximum earnings were from fruit and vegetable growers had at least two farm employers. Almost 72,000 farm workers had at least one farm and at least one non-farm employer in 2014, and almost 60% of these workers had their maximum earnings from NAICS 1151 crop support establishments, followed by 18% whose maximum earnings were from fruit growers. The most common non-farm jobs were in manufacturing; professional, scientific and technical services; and accommodation and food services. Finally, some 26,000 workers whose maximum earnings were in agriculture had at least two farm employers and at least one non-farm employer. Over half of these workers had their maximum earnings in crop support services and over a quarter in fruit and tree nut farming . The combined 220,500 workers with at least two employers in 2014 were most often employed in the same county. For example, over 8% of these two employer workers had two jobs in Kern County, followed by 6% with two jobs in Fresno County and 5% with two jobs in Monterey County. Approximately 22% of workers with two jobs in 2014 were employed in 1113 fruits and nuts and 1151 crop support, followed by 5% to 6% who combined 1151 with 5613 employment services, 1113 fruits and nuts with another 1113 job, at least two 1151 crop support jobs, and 1112 vegetables with 1151 crop support.The number of wage and salary workers employed on California farms is of great interest because of fears that farm labor shortages could reduce the state’s production of labor-intensive crops.